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Mr. David Moon 
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Knoxville, TN 37902 
Dear Mr. Moon: 
Phone 423-595-8785 
As we discussed on February 23, I have investigated how to determine when mergers and 
acquisitions create value for investors. 
Investment advisors and academic researchers continue to debate the question of when a merger 
or acquisition creates value for investors. This informational report contributes to the body of 
research on this problem, but also seeks to answer a specific question of what characteristics of 
mergers and acquisitions suggest that the new company will create abnormally high shareholder 
value. 
Research shows that mergers between companies that were not formerly direct competitors, but 
that were in the same industry group performed better than deals between fierce rivals. Cash 
transactions reward investors better than deals that involve stock trades. Also, hostile acquirers 
receive better returns than friendly acquirers. Also, target shareholders in contested bids tend to 
earn significantly large returns. 
In summary, cash deals that come as hostile takeovers between intra-industry firms create the 
greatest shareholder returns when the firms are not direct rivals. The most successful investors 
look for deals that involve these characteristics to achieve the greatest long-term return on 
investment. 
I still need to explore how a merger or acquisition constructed as a purchase of interest rewards 
investors compared to a deal constructed as a pooling of interest. The Form of Payment section 
indirectly addresses one of the key differences between these two deal structures. However, I 
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How to Determine When Mergers and Acquisition Create Value for 
Long-Term Investors 
Executive Summary 
Research shows that mergers between companies that were not formerly direct 
competitors but that were in the same industry group performed better than deals between fierce 
rivals. Cash transactions reward investors better than deals that involve stock trades. Also, 
hostile acquirers receive better returns than friendly acquirers do. Most information suggests that 
targets that receive multiple, contested bids also outperform targets for which bidders do not 
need to compete. 
Investors regularly purchase shares of companies that have recently merged with, or have 
acquired other firms. However, despite their research and analysis, investors do not consistently 
achieve higher returns on their investment in the newly merged entity than they might have with 
investments in the two separate entities. 
Fronl a strictly financial perspective, buyers would pay for the net assets of a target 
company. But the deal drivers nlake up the difference between the net assets and the tinal 
purchase price. Acquirers and targets establish the deal structure through the due diligence 
process. The structure of the deal can significantly affect the company operations, employee 
jobs, management compensation packages and product mix. 
The criterion of this report is how successfully it guides investors to purchase company 
shares that will generate superior returns. The characteristics that the report considers are among 
the most important guides to shareholder returns outside of the inherent worth of the companies 
involved in the deal. Certainly, whether a firm is well managed and provides a useful product 
are the most important indications of a firm's ability to produce revenues and cash t10ws. 
With an understanding of the key characteristics of the deal, investors can lllore 
successfully chose between firms that seem to have similar financial prospects and invest in the 
one with the best deal structure. In a similar fashion, investors can glean important information 
about the future prospects of a firm from a few preliminary indicators that influence the success 
of a merger or acquisition. 
The conclusions of this report reflect how markets react to different deals, their structures 
and some preliminary factors that can influence a company's future. Readers and investors must 
remember that whether they own shares of the acquiring firm or the acquired tirm affects their 
individual returns. Also, whether they own shares before, during or after a particular deal often 




Investors who purchase shares of recently merged companies want to be sure that they 
invest in companies whose value increases as a result of the merger. 
Purpose 
Investors regularly purchase shares of companies that have recently merged with, or have 
acquired other firms. However, despite their research and analysis, investors do not consistently 
achieve higher returns on their investment in the newly merged entity than they might have with 
investments in the two separate entities. The purpose, therefore, of this project is to identify 
what characteristics of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) suggest that the new company will 
create abnormally high shareholder returns. 
Information for this report comes from sources in the Hodges Library and Law Library at 
the University of Tennessee, and the Davidson County Public Library. Books, financial journals 
and company annual reports will form the base for the report. Additionally, I consult with 
finance professors and local investment advisors. 
Scope 
In this report, I will define and discuss capital markets, the efficient market theory, 
general types of mergers and acquisitions, and the role investors play in the financial market 
system. 
I will investigate the following topics in detail: 
1. What have been significant trends in M&A activity in the US? 
• What have been the causes of merger trends? 
In what ways do capital markets influence and react to corporate transactions? 
• How do markets measure attributes like managerial talent? 
• What other factors influence the way capital markets respond to a deal? 
3. How can the due diligence process affect the success of a merger? 
• What can occur when acquirers do not approach this step properly? 
• In what way does the due diligence process reflect in capital markets? 
4. What are key characteristics of merger and acquisition structures? 
• Mode of acquisition -- Merger v. Tender offer 
• Form of payment -- Cash v. Stock 
5. What are important preliminary indicators of merger and acquisition returns? 
• The struggle for the target -- Contested bid v. Uncontested bid 
• Pre-deal relations -- Cordial competition v. Fierce rivalry 
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The report will not attempt to discuss taxes and their effects primarily because tax laws 
vary by country and change frequently. The report focuses on the factors that make a merger 
profitable, and will not focus on why corporate managers believe mergers might be profitable. 
Limitations 
This report's conclusions may only have predictive value in cases that are similar to the 
ones I discuss here. Most of the information relates to large, publicly traded companies that are 
widely held. Small, private companies may produce results that do not conform to this report's 
conclusions. Realistically, this project will build upon existing works and offer an elementary 
method to understand under what circumstances merging companies will create value for 
investors. 
Assumptions 
I assume that governments will not significantly alter the regulations to which merging 
companies must adhere. Additionally, this report's conclusions will remain valid as long as 
investors receive free flows of information, and capital markets in individual countries remain 
linked globally. I also assume that investors will continue to measure total return on investment 
by increased share value instead of other non-financial factors. 
Criteria 
The criterion of this report is how successfully it guides investors to hold or purchase 
company shares that will generate superior returns. As a corollary, it should guide investors to 
sell or reduce their holdings of company shares as welL 
Significant US Merger Trends 
This century has allowed the United States to expand the limits of capitalism. Trends in 
mergers have expanded and changed as welL Particularly since the years around World War II, 
the US economy has lead the world's economic trends. Researchers frequently identify five 
distinct merger waves that were lead by or have produced economic changes in this century. 
The first great merger wave climaxed in 1900. The trend of horizontal consolidations in 
several manufacturing industries in the US changed the country's business landscape. Especially 
active participants in this wave were companies in the primary metals, food, non-electrical 
machinery, transportation equipment, tobacco, chemicals and metal products industries (Post 13). 
This movement accompanied major changes in economic infrastructure and production 
technologies that created economies of scale and specialization. 
Page 3 
The second major merger wave occurred during the roaring 20's, in which public utilities 
and banking industries actively participated. Food processing, retailing, chemicals, and mining 
sectors became targets during this time of vertical integration. Analysts note that companies 
expanded their operations vertically to benefit from production efficiencies that shortened 
processes and eliminated waste, and secured inputs and product outlets (Post 14). 
The next major wave of transactions occurred during the 1960's, and peaked at the 
economic climax of 1968. The conglomerate became the favorite corporate structure for 
takeovers (compared to horizontal and vertical), and almost half of the firms regarded as 
conglomerates were based in the defense and aerospace industries. These government budget-
dependent industries were volatile, however, and they diversified broadly into durable goods, 
petroleum and coal products, paper products, and industrial chemicals. 
The mid 1970's to late 1980's showed managers shift from the conglomerate mentality to 
a more strategic focus on mergers. Firms in oil and gas extraction, electronic equipment and 
industrial machinery sought to solidify their core activities (Post 15). Horizontal acquiring 
returned as firms bought smaller or weaker competitors that were very similar to themselves. 
In the 1990's, companies have developed the desire to offer "one-stop shopping" and 
have focused their acquisitions on firms that provide complementary goods and services. The 
financial and telecommunications industries are excellent examples of this latest wave. Insurers, 
brokerage firms, investment banks, credit card companies and commercial banks have joined to 
offer clients a huge array of financial services. In telecommunications, cable, local and long 
distance telephone providers, Internet providers, motion picture conlpanies, and print media 
companies are joining forces to control the information age. 
Despite these waves of activity, inconclusive support exists about why they occur. 
Indeed, some claim that each wave has its own unique causes that do not repeat themselves. 
Nonetheless, the reasons managers and investors use to defend each trend generally center 
around making more money. The inconsistency of their results, however, suggests that while 
they may need to change with trends to survive in an evolving marketplace, these external forces 
are not necessarily good indicators of their ability to reward investors through the capital 
markets. 
Mergers, Acquisitions and the Capital Markets 
Researchers continue to study how capital markets influence and react to mergers and 
acquisitions. The equity markets often dictate the terms of a potential acquisition bid, and they 
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are also the scorecards by which investors determine if they have made or lost llloney on various 
transactions. 
Frequently, once a potential acquirer announces a bid (offer) for another firm, the stock of 
the target (acquired) company jumps significantly. This sometimes happens because investors 
believe that the acquirer has information or resources to use with the target which will increase 
the value of the firm. They may also believe that the target's management was weak and 
inefficient, and that the acquirer will remove these incompetent managers and run the company 
better. 
At the same time, however, that the target firm's stock often rises, the stock price of the 
acquirer often falls or remains unchanged. Investors realize that the acquiring firm lllUSt deal 
with the potential of serious problems that can accompany an acquisition. The acquirer must 
successfully meld different cultures, coordinate different management structures, lllaintain 
employee morale, incur transition costs and accounting charge-offs, and ultimately ensure that 
the target firm is really worth what they paid for it. 
The capital markets will assess all of these and more factors about a proposed merger and 
assign a value that mayor may not accurately reflect the true value of the firm and it's earning 
potential. Still, investors depend on these fickle and volatile markets. 
Due Diligence 
Even when a target's financial statements are accurate, they can seriously lllislead a 
buyer that doesn't examine them in detail. Beyond the financial due diligence, acquirers can 
ensure that they receive what they pay for with a due diligence process that confirms whether the 
drivers that made a deal attractive are really as good as they look. Acquirers that conduct due 
diligence to get behind the corporate-wide financial statements that Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practices (GAAP) require will increase the chance of success for themselves and for 
investors. 
Fron1 a strictly financial perspective, buyers would pay for the net assets of a target 
company. But the deal drivers make up the difference between the net assets and the final 
purchase price. Mergers & Acquisitions agrees with the idea that these non-financial aspects 
like markets and n1arket share, products and technology, brand names, managen1ent teams, 
opportunities to cut costs and synergies are still important (Filek 29). Real due diligence has to 
address these deal drivers. To that end, the goal of due diligence is to validate a purchase price 
that frequently exceeds net asset value. 
Acquirers and targets establish the deal structure through the due diligence process. The 
structure of the deal can significantly affect the company operations, employee jobs, 
management compensation packages and product mix. This research focuses on how the deal 
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structure affects investors who own stock in either the acquirer or target, since the capital 
markets will account for all of the above factors through the prices it assigns. For that reason, the 
due diligence process is very inlportant for investors because it can determine how well a 
conlpany rewards investors over the long term. 
The various trends, or waves, of merger and acquisition activity identified above do not 
necessarily reward investors abnormally because of the type of company acquired, or because of 
any particular trend behind the acquisition. Exogenous factors like the era in which a deal was 
conducted and the state of the economy have not conclusively produced abnormally high 
shareholder returns by themselves. Rather, the characteristics of the deal structure more likely 
contribute to the way capital markets respond in the long term and to the type of returns investors 
receive. Due diligence begins that process, and the structure that evolves from it suggests 
whether the new company will create abnormally high shareholder value. 
Critical Characteristics of the Deal Structure 
Mode of Acquisition 
The mode of acquisition offers a crucial piece of information about an announced deal. 
Mergers are different from tender offers. A Journal of Finance article defines the two ideas 
clearly. "Mergers are usually friendly deals that enjoy the cooperation of incumbent managers. 
Tender offers are made directly to target shareholders, often to overcome resistance from 
incumbent nlanagers, and indicate greater confidence in the acquirer's ability to realize efficiency 
gains from the acquisition" (Loughran 1767). 
One of the significant effects of a tender offer, or hostile takeover, is that the managers of 
the acquired firm tend to leave shortly after the deal. Tender offers coincide with acquirers that 
expect to benefit from company synergies. Additionally, some research suggests that firms that 
make tender offers continue to bypass the target's managers, and create additional efficiency by 
removing them (Martin and McConnell 671). 
We may deduce a few things from this information. Shareholders in the target firm were 
probably dissatisfied with existing management, and the buyer offered them a higher price per 
share than they thought they could gain otherwise. At the same time, investors who hold shares 
of the acquiring firm mayor may not benefit over the long term from this type of deal because 
acquiring managers base their bid price on earning expectations which mayor may not 
materialize for the combined firm. Other factors also contribute to investor returns, but history 
strongly suggests that shareholders of the target firm in tender offers fare much better than their 
peers who are in mergers and own shares of the acquirer. 
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Form of Payment 
The form of payment that a bidding company offers to its target tells a lot about the deal 
and its prospects as well. Since managers have information that investors do not, firms will most 
likely issue stock when they believe the equity markets have overvalued it. Accordingly, firms 
will usually chose to offer cash when the stock is undervalued. Interestingly, the form of 
payment correlates highly to the mode of acquisition. For example, acquirers often finance a 
merger with their stock, but they will almost always offer cash when they make a tender offer 
(Loughran 1767). 
Countless researchers have concluded that cash deals reward investors nlore richly than 
stock deals. More specifically, target shareholders receive significantly higher returns when the 
acquirer uses cash. Additionally, the strength a cash acquirer demonstrates suggests that its 
ability to generate positive returns will continue to reward shareholders. Ironically, the idea of 
market efficiency does not allow shareholders of the already-strong acquirer to receive 
abnormally high returns. Rather, investors will have already accurately evaluated and priced 
those shares, making them profitable but not abnormally superior performers. 
Cash bids also suggest that the acquiring firm has great confidence in the prospects of its 
target. Furthermore, a cash transaction suggests the bidder's ability to sustain substantial future 
cash flows from its existing assets. These indications frequently increase the market value of the 
acquired firm. However, as Opler and Weston suggest, "this value change reflects Inarket 
assessment of undervaluation, rather than altered cash flows and increased wealth" (Post 210). 
Equity issues are rare in tender offers, but they occur commonly in lnergers. Frequently, 
managers decide to offer a stock swap that allows the stronger firm to absorb the target. This 
arrangement often disappoints the stockholders of the acquiring firm: The target firm's 
shareholders experience nlixed results, depending on whether the merger resulted from an 
interest in horizontal or vertical integration, but they rarely achieve the abnormally high returns 
of cash deals. The firms merged to capitalize on horizontal integration perform slightly better 
than deals based on vertical integration, but if the deal structure involves an equity issue or stock 
swap returns to investors tend not to be spectacular. 
Preliminary Indicators of Return 
The Struggle for the Target 
The question of whether deals that involve multiple bidders for a single target offer 
abnormally high returns produces mixed answers. In this case, independent of the mode of 
acquisition or form of payment, the bidding climate directs the returns shareholders achieve. 
Target shareholders are clear winners when two or more bidders struggle to beat each other's 
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offers by increasing the price per share above market value and realistic expectations. In these 
cases, the "unfortunate winner" may find itself unable to create a solid return on investment, 
much to the chagrin of its original shareholders. 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim offer evidence which suggests that bidders in contested bids 
earn significant negative returns (3). However, 1. Franks et al. find that even though bidders pay 
more for contested targets (multiple bidders), they do not necessarily experience significant 
negative announcement returns (92). Rather, they suggest that the difference to shareholders 
over the long term is statistically insignificant based on the bidding climate. 
In light of several sources, including Post (212), which argue that target finns in 
contested bids do earn significantly positive returns, I prefer to agree with the overwhelming 
evidence and to dismiss the findings of 1. Franks et aL on this issue as statistically insignificant. 
The issue of capital market efficiency resurfaces here. Most empirical evidence suggests 
that capital markets constantly evaluate and balance the worth of a company with the price 
investors are willing to pay for that company. Bids that offer target shareholders abnormally 
higher returns defy this theory because rational investors should not willingly pay more for 
something than it is worth. The anomaly occurs frequently when bidders attelnpt to outbid each 
other for a potential target, and the windfalls that investors may receive in these cases do 
represent abnormally high returns. 
I realize that it may be very difficult to predict if a potential target may draw the bids of 
multiple acquirers. Investors can increase their chances of finding these types of firms by 
looking to industries or sectors that have recently attracted such attention, or that have found 
acquirers willing to offer extremely high premiums for a target in an attempt to ward off other 
likely bidders. 
Pre-Deal Relations 
The way firms relate to one another before they join to forn1 one company can 
significantly impact the performance of their combined entity. The due diligence process can 
often smooth n1anagerial transitions and tensions that may exist on a corporate level between 
both firms. However, the job of this transition team becomes more complicated and ultimately 
more important with cases in which the companies were fierce rivals as opposed to cordial 
competitors. 
Normally, companies that compete for revenues from the similar client pools are not 
"cordial." However, many instances exist that allow competitors to coexist without developing 
intense animosities or negative feelings toward each other. When each firm develops a culture 
that repulses the other, serious issues may surface after senior managers complete the deal. Mark 
Heitner writes in Mergers & Acquisitions, "One of the most serious problems in a Inerger of 
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rivals is the danger of losing customers and key employees" (18). This issue is more difficult to 
evaluate, and the effects are nlore difficult to predict than the other factors discussed. 
If we consider a theoretical example like a proposed merger between Coca-Cola and 
Pepsi, this point becomes clearer. Employees in both companies believe that their firm is the 
best. They also tend to believe that their own products are vastly superior to those of their rival. 
They have each told customers as many bad things about each other as they could legally say. 
Suddenly combining these two groups and asking them to work together as a team would 
certainly jeopardize customers and employees. 
All others things equal, mergers and acquisitions between firms that were not fierce, 
bitter rivals before joining generally perform better than others. A thorough due diligence 
process in these cases should include a business plan and clearly articulated new lnission for the 
combined entity. In mergers between fierce rivals, the deal structures and preliminary indicators 
explained above influence the success of the new company, but if managers neglect these softer 
issues they can seriously undermine the long-term profitability of their new company. 
Between investments that are otherwise very similar, investors tend to receive better 
returns when the firms are not fierce rivals before they combine. At this point, I have not found 
conclusive empirical research that shows the difference in returns between investors of fierce 
rivals and cordial competitors. However, studies of net income and revenue growth indicate that 
firms meet expectations more frequently when they were cordial (Heitner 22). 
Conclusions 
One of the IUOSt inlportant parts of a merger or acquisition, apart frolu the inherent 
strengths of the firms involved, is the structure of the deal. The mode of acquisition can have a 
large impact on shareholders' returns of the target firnl. A merger frequently rewards target 
shareholders, and frequently disappoints shareholders of the bidding firm. On the other hand, 
when an acquirer bypasses incumbent management to make a tender offer directly to target 
shareholders these investors often receive abnormally high returns. 
Highly correlated to the mode of acquisition, the form of payment also gives shareholders 
different returns. Cash deals reward investors more richly than stock deals do. Some underlying 
reasons behind why managers chose to offer equity instead of cash suggest that investors will not 
receive huge returns in the long term. Cash offers bode well for both the target and acquiring 
shareholders. 
Before managers finalize the ternlS of a merger or acquisition, the number of bidders 
interested in a particular target affects investor returns as well. Despite efficient market theories, 
bidders sometimes offer and pay more for a target than appears prudent. In these scenarios, the 
obvious winners are the target shareholders. Multiple bidders do not always pay too Iuuch for a 
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target, as the competition may bring the eventual sale price up to market value from a discounted 
first offer. Still, in a case where all other factors are equal, a contested bid will at least reward 
investors better than an uncontested bid. 
Finally, pre-deal relations affect company performance and shareholder returns. Firms 
that are not fierce rivals generally perform worse than others after a merger or acquisition. 
Managers must work through several issues to make two environments that once fought each 
other to suddenly work smoothly and harmoniously together. In this case, both acquirers and 
targets regularly do not meet expectations. 
Combinations of factors influence company performance that are broad, alnbiguous and 
unpredictable. Managers who conduct a thorough due diligence process have a better chance of 
creating a better union between firms, but the capital markets can create havoc for even the most 
conscientious dealmakers. The body of research on this topic is large and continues to grow, to 
which this report makes a small contribution. 
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Glossary 
Acquisition. Occurs when one company agrees to purchase a majority of the outstanding stock 
of another company 
Bid. Offer, or formal price that an acquirer submits to own part or all of a target. 
Capital Markets. Financial markets that deal with securities whose maturities are greater than 
one year 
Corporate Value. Measured by different means, but generally described as what a particular 
company's shares should be worth, and what investors should be willing to pay to own them 
Due Diligence. A legal and financial process through which firms inspect each other's financial 
strengths and weaknesses before completing a merger or acquisition. 
Efficient Market Theory. Theory argues that capital markets accurately reflect all available 
information at all times, and that investors cannot consistently earn abnormally high returns 
legally. In Graham and Dodd's Security Analysis, Cottle et al. dedicates a chapter to this topic 
by the same name and explains the strong, semi-strong, and weak forms of this theory. 
Merger. Occurs when two companies agree to combine resources and form one legal entity with 
only one corporate structure and share price 
Tender Offer. An offer that an acquirer makes directly to the shareholders of a target, usually 
bypassing the incumbent target's managers 
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